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Conscientious Exemptions: From Toleration to Neutrality; From 
Neutrality to Respect 
John Adenitire 
  
1. Introduction 
 
A judge of the Tax Chamber of the First Tier Tribunal is tasked with considering two claims for 
exemption from the legal duty on businesses to file their tax returns online.  A paraphrasing of the 
relevant exemption provision says that 
a person who the HMRC is satisfied is a practising member of a religious society or order 
whose beliefs are incompatible with the use of electronic communications is not required to 
make a return by an electronic return system.1  
The two claimants before the judge challenge HMRC’s decision not to grant them the exemption.  The 
first claimant, call him Mr Climate Change, says that he believes that using electronic communications 
is immoral because it leads to climate change.  He says that  
He believes that consumption of fossil fuels induces climate change by increasing CO2 in the 
atmosphere, and that internet usage puts more CO2 in the atmosphere than aviation. He 
objects to ‘paperless’ communications on the grounds that he considers paper 
communications create ‘carbon sinks’ to reduce CO2 in the atmosphere whereas electronic 
data centres burn massive amounts of carbon fuels thus increasing CO2 in the atmosphere.2 
The second claimant, call him Mr Bible Believer, says that he should be granted the exemption 
because the Bible is against the use of electronic communications.  He says that 
The content of some television programmes and internet websites [are] contrary to the Bible's 
teaching as he [understands] it. But in addition, he [considers] computers and television as a 
whole as forms of “worldliness” which might seduce people away from “righteousness”. (…) 
He [considers] that people [are] obsessed by them, almost regarding them as “idols”. (…) He 
considers that modern media and in particular the “screen” has “blinded the minds of non-
believers” and that people's time is so taken up with electronic communications that they no 
longer have time for religion in their lives.3 
What moral considerations should guide the judge in reaching a decision on who should benefit from 
the exemption?  Should he take more seriously the claim by Mr Bible Believer because of the 
implications for religious freedom inherent in his claim?  But is concern for the environment not as 
equally compelling as concern for religious freedom?  What moral principle best explains and should 
guide the practice of the judge considering to grant exemptions to these conscientious objectors?   
                                                          
 This paper was written while a Visiting Research Fellow at Yale Law School.  Many thanks to Professor Patrick 
Weil for making my fellowship possible.  Previous drafts were presented at research seminars in Cambridge 
and at the LARSN 2016 conference.  Thanks are due to the various organisers and participants.  Special thanks 
to Professor TRS Allan, Yossi Nehushtan, Joshua Neoh, Raffael Fasel and Ya Lan Chang for written comments.  
The paper is dedicated to Joseph Raz who generously discussed with me some of the ideas in the paper. 
1 Regulation 25A(6) of the Value Added Tax Regulations 1995. 
2 Exmoor Coast Boat Cruises Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2014] UKFTT 1103 [27]. 
3 Blackburn & Anor v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 525 [13]. 
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The questions raised in the last paragraph apply to scenarios that go well beyond exemptions from 
online tax returns.  Liberal states are faced with a wide variety of individuals demanding to be exempt 
from legal obligations that go to the very heart of liberalism.  Some individuals have objected to 
celebrating same-sex marriages4; others to providing commercial services to homosexual couples5; 
some do not want to be involved in anything remotely associated with abortion or contraception6; 
some do not want to wear protective headgear while working or riding a motorcycle.7  The list could 
go on.  The point being made here is that understanding what principles describe and should guide 
instances of requests for conscientious exemptions is an important one which may provide solutions 
to a recurring problem in liberal states. 
Various distinguished scholars have risen to the challenge to solve this problem.  They propose that 
the moral principle which best explains and should guide the practice of conscientious exemptions is 
that of toleration.8  The most recent and most vocal advocate of this view is Yossi Nehushtan, who will 
be the main interlocutor of this paper.  In a paper published in this journal which he amplifies in his 
recent book, he argues that  
[G]ranting conscientious exemptions is usually the outcome of tolerance and (…) the principle 
of tolerance better explains both the practice of granting conscientious exemptions and the 
attitude of those who grant exemption.9       
Nehushtan is joined by other scholars in this view, including Brian Leiter and Peter Jones.10  From the 
principle of toleration Nehushtan is able to draw normative conclusions as to how and when 
conscientious exemptions should be granted.  For example, following Nehushtan’s complex views (to 
be explained below), the link between toleration and exemptions would result in Mr Bible Believer 
being more likely to lose his claim than Mr Climate Change. 
The main purpose of this paper is to suggest that this view is misguided.  The practice of 
conscientious exemptions is not best explained nor should it be mainly guided by the principle of 
toleration.  It is not denied that toleration may at times help explain some of the features of this 
practice.  However, it is argued that if toleration has at all any role to play in explaining or guiding the 
practice of conscientious exemption, that role should be kept within rigorous boundaries.  Rather than 
making reference to toleration as an explanatory or guiding principle, ultimately it is best to make 
reference instead to a cluster of moral principles which better explain and provide solid normative 
foundations for the practice.   
                                                          
4 Miller v Davis (No 15A250) (Supreme Court). 
5 Bull v Hall [2013] 1 WLR 3741. 
6 Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc (2014) 134 SCt 2751 (Supreme Court); Doogan and another v Greater 
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board [2015] AC 640. 
7 VG Freiburg, Urt v 29102015 – 6 K 2929/14.  This German case involved a Sikh unsuccessfully challenging the 
obligation to wear a helmet while riding a motorbike.  
8 In line with much scholarship, this paper uses tolerance and toleration as synonymous.  This is however not a 
semantic issue without its problems.  See Andrew R Murphy, ‘Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition’ 
(1997) 29 Polity 593. 
9 Yossi Nehushtan, Intolerant Religion in a Tolerant-Liberal Democracy (Hart Publishing 2015) 129–130; Yossi 
Nehushtan, ‘What Are Conscientious Exemptions Really About?’ (2013) 2 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 
395–397. 
10 Brian Leiter, ‘Reply to Five Critics of Why Tolerate Religion?’ [2016] Criminal Law and Philosophy 1, 6.  He 
here replies to François Boucher and Cécile Laborde, ‘Why Tolerate Conscience?’ [2014] Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 1.  For a more general defence of the relationship between toleration and conscientious 
exemptions see Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton University Press 2013) 68–134.  Peter Jones, 
‘Accommodating Religion and Shifting Burdens’ [2014] Criminal Law and Philosophy 1, 2.  A full argument is 
provided in Peter Jones, ‘Toleration, Religion and Accommodation’ (2015) 23 European Journal of Philosophy 
542, 550–551. 
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As to be developed in detail below, the main reason for marginalising toleration is that in judicial 
practice regarding conscientious exemptions the law has committed itself to the principle of neutrality 
towards the content of conscientious objectors’ beliefs.  Doctrinal and normative evidence will be 
adduced to show that the law on conscientious exemptions rightly marginalises toleration as the basis 
of conscientious exemptions.  If this argument is right and toleration is and ought to be marginalised 
by the law of conscientious exemptions, then toleration cannot help us determine when and how 
exemptions should be granted.  Instead, we would have to make recourse to a cluster of moral 
principles which explain and guide that practice.  That cluster is complex and contains various 
principles, including respect for state neutrality, autonomy, conscience and well-being.  It is by being 
attentive to this cluster of principles and paying due respect to them that liberal states may begin to 
acquire principled answers to the problems raised by conscientious exemptions. 
Part 2 of this essay explains why Nehushtan and others make recourse to toleration to explain the 
practice of conscientious exemptions.  It also explains the practical significance of the link between 
toleration and exemptions.  Part 3 explains why the principle of toleration cannot and should not do 
the work Nehushtan and others want it to do.  Doctrinal and normative arguments are adduced to 
show that the law of various liberal states prohibit judges considering exemptions from passing moral 
judgement on the content of the beliefs of conscientious objectors.  In short, the law rightly embraces 
neutrality and marginalises toleration.  Part 4 provides an alternative to toleration as the basis of 
conscientious exemptions.  It argues that it is respect for a cluster of moral principles which should 
guide the practice of conscientious exemptions.  Under that view, Mr Climate Change and Mr Bible 
Believer have similar chances of winning their claims.  
2. Conscientious Exemptions, Toleration and Why the Link 
Between the Two Matters    
 
This part explains what Nehushtan takes the concept of toleration to be.  It then shows why 
Nehushtan thinks that toleration best explains and should guide the practice of conscientious 
exemptions.  Finally, it explains the significance of this view for the way liberal states should deal with 
specific instances of conscientious exemptions.   
A. What is Toleration? 
According to Nehushtan, ‘People make adverse judgments about others. These judgments may 
provide reasons to harm or offend the others. Yet the tolerant person has reasons--any type of 
reasons--not to act in certain ways that may harm or offend another’.11  Similarly, Brian Leiter argues 
that toleration is an act ‘of “putting up” with practices of which one disapproves because it is morally 
right to do so’.12  Peter Jones is perhaps the more nuanced of the three.  He provides a similar 
definition of toleration but admits that applying this definition in the context of conscientious 
exemptions raises complications.  Those complications will be analysed in due course.  For now, it 
suffices to say that Jones provides a very similar initial definition of toleration to Nehushtan and Leiter.  
He says that  
In simple analyses of toleration, we frequently use a model of person-to-person toleration. 
Person A objects to the conduct of person B, is able to prevent B’s conduct if he so chooses, 
but allows B to continue with that conduct. In that case, A tolerates B’s conduct.13        
At the basis of these similar definitions of toleration is the precondition of an adverse moral judgement 
towards the person being tolerated.  All three scholars agree that one of the essential ingredients is 
                                                          
11 Nehushtan, ‘What Are Conscientious Exemptions Really About?’ (n 9) 395. 
12 Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (n 10) 3. 
13 Jones, ‘Toleration, Religion and Accommodation’ (n 10) 545. 
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that the tolerant person must, in order to be considered tolerant, hold a negative moral judgement 
about the person that is being tolerated.  As Leiter puts it, ‘toleration is not at issue in cases where 
one group is simply indifferent to another.’14  One can also add that toleration is not at issue when one 
person or group has a positive moral judgement about another person or group.  A second essential 
ingredient is that the negative moral judgement gives the tolerant person reasons to occasion harm to 
the tolerated.  Finally, and importantly, the last ingredient is that the tolerant person accepts that there 
are reasons which are sufficient to refrain from harming the tolerated despite the existence of the 
negative moral judgement. 
B.  Are Conscientious Exemptions Instances of Toleration? 
A brief sketch of the concept of toleration was provided in the previous part.  This part explains why 
Nehushtan regards conscientious exemptions as instances of toleration.  He has argued in this 
journal that 
typically, granting conscientious exemptions from a legal rule presupposes that the state does 
not share the conscientious objector's values (…). Otherwise, the exemption would have 
been the general rule rather than the exemption to it. In other words, the state usually makes 
an adverse judgment about the conscientious objector's values (…). This judgment gives the 
state reasons not to grant the conscientious objector an exemption from the legal rule 
(thereby harming him). If the state decides to grant conscientious exemptions after all, it can 
be seen as tolerant.15 
Nehushtan’s argument seems plausible and fairly intuitive.  It may be applied to the tax exemption 
scenario considered above.  In that scenario the state does not consider that filing tax returns online 
is morally problematic and therefore imposes the general rule that tax returns should be filed 
electronically.  By imposing this general rule the state may be viewed as not sharing the values of Mr 
Bible Believer or Mr Climate Change.  If the state had held these values, it would have imposed a 
general rule that tax returns should be filed on paper and not electronically.  The state may therefore 
be viewed as holding an adverse moral judgement about the unusual views of Mr Bible Believer or Mr 
Climate Change. This adverse moral judgement gives the state reason to employ its coercive arm to 
force the claimants to comply with the general rule.  However, for a variety of reasons which we shall 
not investigate, the state has refrained from coercing the claimants and has provided an exemption 
which Mr Bible Believer and Mr Climate Change may in principle benefit from.  The availability of this 
exemption appears then to be an instance of toleration. 
It is worth noting at this point that Nehushtan employs Jones’s person-to-person model of toleration 
which was described earlier.  The person doing the toleration here is a personification of the state and 
the persons being tolerated here are Mr Bible Believer and Mr Climate Change.16   
However, because the state is a complex aggregate of individuals and institutions, it is very 
problematic to attribute any one single intention or attitude to it without speaking metaphorically or by 
extension.  Only real people and some animals hold actual intentions and attitudes and the state is 
not a real person.  This is not to deny that institutions and state officials may speak on behalf of the 
state.  However, it is very plausible that the various institutions and officials who represent the state 
may hold different and incompatible attitudes.  It is for this reason that Jones is less inclined to identify 
the state as the person doing the toleration.  He says that    
the problem of identifying a tolerator arises from use of the person-to-person model of 
toleration. Rather than viewing exemptions according to that model, we would do better to see 
                                                          
14 Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (n 10) 8. 
15 Nehushtan, ‘What Are Conscientious Exemptions Really About?’ (n 9) 3.  
16 Leiter also adopts this personification.  See Leiter, ‘Reply to Five Critics of Why Tolerate Religion?’ (n 10) 6. 
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them as representing a society’s public stance on what should and should not be tolerated. 
Toleration is a feature of the exemptions themselves rather than an expression of any 
particular person’s or party’s toleration.17  
Jones’s strategy is ingenuous. Perceiving the personification problem associated with the person-to-
person model he would abandon that model in the context of exemptions and simply state that 
exemptions represent a society’s public stance on things that ought to be tolerated.  But this is not 
less problematic than the person-to-person model.  While it is not uncommon to speak of certain laws 
as representing society’s commitment to one cause or another, a little analysis usually reveals that 
this manner of speech is either figurative or refers to specific individuals or a group of them.  Just like 
the state, society is a complex aggregate of individuals and institutions the very components of which 
might hold different views about the desirability of the laws which allegedly represent their 
commitments (think, for example, of the very controversial laws allowing abortion or same-sex 
marriage).  So it is best to speak of these laws, including exemptions, as either representing the views 
of those components of society which support them or, alternatively, as representing the views of the 
law-making institutions responsible for those laws.18  Of course, subject to the availability of 
exemptions, law enforcing institutions will be legally authorised to enforce hotly controversial laws 
irrespective of whether or not legal subjects accept that those laws represent their stance on 
particular issues. 
C. Why does it Matter that Conscientious Exemptions are Instances of 
Toleration? 
Let us, for now, put to one side the worries about the adequacy of fit between toleration and 
exemptions.  Part 3 of this paper will be devoted entirely to unravelling those worries.  Instead, let us 
consider what Nehushtan is trying to achieve by arguing that exemptions should be seen as instances 
of toleration.  Nehushtan puts it very squarely when he says that 
If, as I suggest, granting conscientious exemptions is in most cases the outcome of tolerance, 
then the practice of granting conscientious exemptions is closely related to the complex 
question of the limits of tolerance.  Within this context we ask whether religion is special: 
whether there is something special about religion that justifies a greater or lesser amount of 
tolerance towards claims (…) to be granted conscientious exemptions.19 
As the quote above indicates, Nehushtan’s argument aims to show that the link between toleration 
and exemptions can help liberal states decide when conscientious exemptions should be granted.  In 
his view, if there are limits to what ought to be tolerated then it may be that those limits indicate when 
certain exemptions should or should not be granted.  In particular, his hypothesis is that there might 
be something special about religion that militates against toleration of religious beliefs and, therefore, 
militates against granting exemptions to religious objectors.   
The title of Nehushtan’s monograph (Intolerant Religion in a Tolerant-Liberal Democracy) gives away 
what he thinks is distinctive about religion: it is inherently intolerant.  He argues at length that ‘there 
are meaningful, unique links between religion and intolerance, and between holding religious beliefs 
and holding intolerant views (and ultimately acting upon these views)’.20  Embracing the liberal 
perfectionism of Raz, he argues that the principle of toleration requires that a liberal state should 
                                                          
17 Jones, ‘Toleration, Religion and Accommodation’ (n 10) 551. 
18 This argument was borrowed from John Gardner who is sceptical of similar personifications of, or attribution 
of attitudes to, the law.  See John Gardner, ‘How Law Claims, What Law Claims’, Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 126–127. 
19 Nehushtan, Intolerant Religion (n 9) 137. 
20 ibid 3. 
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discourage intolerant views21 (broadly speaking views which undermine the liberal commitment to civil 
and political rights).  His conclusion is then that, given that religion is inherently intolerant, liberal 
democracies should discourage religious practices.  This entails that whenever a claim for exemption 
is made by a religious conscientious objector, ‘the religiosity of a legal claim is normally a reason, 
although not necessarily a prevailing one, to reject that claim’.22  This would entail that, all things 
being equal, in the context of the tax exemption above Mr Bible Believer should have a lesser chance 
of winning his claim than Mr Climate Change.   
Many will be hesitant to agree with Nehushtan’s views about the inherently intolerant nature of 
religion.  Some have argued against the view that religion should be discouraged in a liberal 
democracy because there is no evidence that religious beliefs are inherently intolerant, although they 
sometimes are, or that they necessarily lead to intolerant practices, although they sometimes do.23  
Others argue that religion is a distinctively worthwhile institution which should be highly valued in a 
liberal democracy.  In fact they argue that exemptions should be more readily granted to religious 
conscientious objectors than to non-religious objectors given that religion should be particularly 
cherished and protected in a liberal state.  An argument often adduced for this view is that religious 
commands, coming from a divine authority which is superior to human authority (including secular 
moral conscience), demand priority over non-religious commands, including secular laws.  On this 
view, religious conscientious objectors deserve to be tolerated more than non-religious conscientious 
objectors.24  If this view is followed, Mr Bible Believer should have a higher chance of winning his 
claim than Mr Climate Change.  
No issue will be taken here on whether or not religious belief is praiseworthy or deserves 
condemnation in the practice of conscientious exemptions.  A stance need only be taken if the 
principle of toleration is used to ground that practice.  Depending on the view taken on the merits of 
religious beliefs, if the principle of toleration guides the practice, then religious objectors will be better 
or worse off than non-religious objectors.  The position to be defended here is that the question as to 
the merits of religious beliefs is mute as the principle of toleration has at most a marginal role in 
describing, and should have little role in guiding, the practice of conscientious exemptions.  It is to this 
defence that part 3 is devoted.    
3. Conscientious Exemptions: From Toleration to Neutrality  
 
This section explores why the practice of granting conscientious exemptions is never straightforwardly 
an instance of toleration.  First, when we investigate the attitude of the individuals responsible for 
granting a statutory exemption the result is often inconclusive: some members of the legislature may 
display the attitude of toleration while others will not.  This is an empirical matter which will often be 
variable depending on the exemption at play.  More fundamentally, however, the attitudes of the 
members of the legislature cannot be attributed to the legislature as an institution.  What the 
legislature intended and what attitude should be attributed to it when it grants a particular statutory 
exemption is a matter to be authoritatively determined by the judiciary.  However, it is clear that the 
jurisprudence of various liberal states prohibits judges from pronouncing any moral judgement, 
especially of a negative character, regarding the content of the beliefs of conscientious objectors.  In 
doing so, the law commands neutrality towards the beliefs of the objector and thereby prevents 
                                                          
21 He makes his main argument in ibid Chapter 3. 
22 ibid 3. 
23  Some arguments are adduced in this respect in John Adenitire, ‘The Irrelevance of Religion’ 2017 
(forthcoming) Jurisprudence. 
24 Kathleen A Brady, The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law: Rethinking Religion Clause Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge University Press 2015).  Michael Stokes Paulsen, ‘Is Religious Freedom Irrational’ (2013) 112 
Michigan Law Review 1043. 
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judges from holding the attitude of toleration when they grant an exemption. Toleration therefore has 
at best a very minor role to play when considering conscientious exemptions.   
A. Attitude of legislative officials granting exemptions 
On 1 October 2015 section 6 of the Deregulation Act came into effect.  It amended section 11 of the 
Employment Act 1989.  Its effect was to exempt Sikhs from the requirement to wear safety helmets 
during employment in any workplace, with the exception of when involved in hazardous activities in 
dangerous workplaces like the army and emergency services.  When the Deregulation Bill was being 
debated in the House of Commons, the Solicitor-General, who sponsored the Bill on behalf of the UK 
Government, spent some time echoing the praises offered by various speakers towards the Sikh 
community.  He said 
Finally, I agree with what the hon. Member for Chesterfield said about the Sikhs. They are a 
fantastic group who have added so much to this country and their history is, as he outlined, a 
very important part of our cultural background as a country. The amendments will be widely 
welcomed in the Sikh community (…).25      
There was no mention throughout his speech nor throughout that of many other speakers in the 
House of Commons (nor in the House of Lords for that matter)26 of any negative moral judgement 
towards the Sikh community or towards their beliefs, whether or not related to the wearing of 
headgear.  Should we then assume that the UK Parliament when it passed the legislation granting the 
exemption was not acting in a tolerant fashion?  If there was no negative judgement which was 
nevertheless followed by the grant of the exemption we should conclude that there was no attitude of 
toleration by the legislature.  This would seem as a direct empirically-based counter-argument to 
Nehushtan’s and other’s view that exemptions are instances of toleration.   
We should pause before reaching such a conclusion.  First, at least one member of the legislature 
potentially acted in a tolerant fashion.  In his speech in the House of Commons, Kevin Hopkins 
expressed his general condemnation of workers not wearing safety headgear at work.  However, 
perhaps because a considerable number of his North Luton constituency are Sikhs, he decided to 
support the grant of the exemption.  His tolerant attitude is evident from his own words: 
I [have] argued strongly that wearing safety helmets on site should be compulsory and a 
matter for the law, because many site workers would not wear a hard hat unless required to 
do so. That was important, but, of course, I entirely understand and support the exception for 
Sikhs. Nevertheless, these days many Sikhs choose not to wear the turban—they pursue 
their faith in other ways. One assumes that Sikhs who do not wear the turban and who are 
working on sites will be covered by the same rules as all the other people on site—namely, 
they will be required to wear a hard hat.27    
Perhaps we should conclude that the legislative grant of the exemption was after all an instance of 
toleration given Kevin Hopkins’s views regarding the matter.  That would appear however 
counterintuitive given that he was the only speaker that displayed an attitude of toleration.  Should we 
reach the opposite conclusion and say that the exemption was not granted out of toleration but rather 
out of admiration for the Sikh community?  This seems more likely as the majority of those that spoke 
in the Houses of Parliament appear to have held that view.   
However, we should pause again before affirming this conclusion.  Remember that the exemption is a 
result of the UK Parliament’s action and intentions.  Parliament is an institution and its actions, intent 
                                                          
25 Deregulation Bill Debate 25 March 2015, col 584. 
26 HL Deb 21 October 2014 Vol 756, Col 587. 
27 Deregulation Bill Debate 25 March 2015, col 582. 
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and attitudes are different from that of its constituent members.  It is now firmly ingrained in 
constitutional theory that legislative intent cannot be a simple matter of aggregating the collective 
intentions of the individual members of the legislature.28  As we have seen when discussing the views 
of the Solicitor-General and of Kevin Hopkins, the individual members may hold different or conflicting 
attitudes.  Also, it is unhelpful to point to the mental state of those sponsoring the particular legislation 
(e.g. the Solicitor-General in this case): their vote on whether to grant the exemption do not count any 
more than those who did not sponsor the Bill.  Even if the majority of the members voted with a 
certain view or attitude we cannot extend the majority’s view to the entire institution of the legislature, 
except metaphorically.  That would entail excluding the minority’s views or attitudes from that of the 
legislature which would not be correct as they are part of the legislature.   
None of the above should be taken to indicate that the legislature as an institution cannot form 
intentions or that legislation, including statutory exemptions, cannot be enacted for certain purposes.  
Rather, the implication of the above discussion is that the attitudes of the members of the legislature 
cannot be conclusive evidence that an exemption was granted because the legislature tolerated the 
conscientious objector.  It is here suggested that if we want to ascertain legislative intention and 
statutory purpose in the context of statutory exemptions we would better look to the institution whose 
main job is to ascertain legislative intent and statutory purpose: the judiciary.  However, as the next 
section suggests, judges considering conscientious exemptions are, for doctrinal reasons which 
reflect valid moral reasons, more than hesitant to express a negative moral judgement about the 
beliefs of conscientious objectors.  If this is true, then judges cannot be engaging in the practice of 
toleration when engaged in the practice of considering whether to grant conscientious exemptions.   
B. Attitudes of judicial officials granting exemptions: the imperative of 
neutrality 
In the previous section, the paper concluded that toleration can at most sometimes explain the 
attitude of certain members of the legislature who vote in favour of a statutory exemption.  This 
section shows that when judicial conscientious exemptions are considered, toleration has even a 
much narrower role to play.  This is because various doctrines prohibit judges from expressing 
negative moral judgements about the content of the beliefs of conscientious objectors. 
If the principle of toleration best explains the practice of conscientious exemptions, as Nehushtan 
would have us believe, then we would expect judges considering cases such as those of Mr Bible 
Believer and Mr Climate Change to spend a good portion of their judgments on whether belief in the 
Bible or the ethics of climate change is rational, desirable, correct etc.  Not only that.  If we were to 
follow Nehushtan’s view we would expect such judgments to tell us why belief in the Bible or the 
ethics of climate change is irrational, undesirable, incorrect, etc.  This is because the principle of 
toleration necessarily requires a negative moral judgement by the person being tolerant towards 
conscientious objectors.   
However, analysis of the judicial doctrine on conscientious exemptions in various liberal states is very 
likely to disappoint those who follow Nehushtan’s view.29  Not only do judges not normally engage in 
                                                          
28 Otherwise diverse scholars such as Dworkin, Waldron, Ekins and Goldsworthy hold the same view.  See 
Ronald M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 1998) ch 9.  Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford 
University Press 1999) ch 6.  Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford University Press 2012) ch 8.  
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University Press 2010) ch 
9.  
29 There is some recent and useful literature on this.  See Anna Su, ‘Judging Religious Sincerity’ (2016) 5 Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 28.  Note that the claim is only made in relation to the practice of conscientious 
exemptions.  There might be other areas of law, e.g. church property and succession cases, where judges are 
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evaluating or condemning the moral beliefs of conscientious objectors; but prevailing doctrines 
prohibit them from doing so.  It is here assumed that, albeit they may fall short of the ideal, the US, 
Canada and most states party to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), including the 
UK, are typical examples of liberal democracies towards which Nehushtan’s work is addressed.  In all 
of these jurisdictions judicial doctrine consistently prohibits moral judgement of the correctness or 
desirability of the moral beliefs of conscientious objectors. 
Let us start with the US.  Take the recent and seminal case of Hobby Lobby30 where the US Supreme 
Court (USSC) exempted a for-profit corporation from the obligation to provide insurance cover which 
would enable Hobby Lobby’s employees to have free access to contraception.  That decision was 
reached under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 (RFRA) which prohibits government from 
substantially burdening a person’s religious freedom except in pursuance of a compelling interest and 
through the least restrictive means available to pursue that interest.  The USSC held that providing 
contraception cover would substantially burden the free exercise of religion of Hobby Lobby’s owners 
who were Evangelical Christians that believed some of those contraceptives to be abortifacient.  The 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) argued that ‘providing the coverage would not itself 
result in the destruction of an embryo; that would occur only if an employee chose to take advantage 
of the coverage’.31  The USSC refused to be involved in having to assess the merits of the religious 
beliefs of Hobby Lobby’s owners.  It said that HHS’s argument  
addresses a very different question that the federal courts have no business addressing 
(whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable) (…) [HHS’s argument] in 
effect tell[s] the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have repeatedly 
refused to take such a step.32 
The USSC then went on to list a series of authorities, including Thomas and Smith,33 which had 
affirmed that doctrine.  The Court stated that ‘repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have 
warned that courts must not presume to determine … the plausibility of a religious claim’; ‘our “narrow 
function … in this context is to determine” whether the line drawn reflects “an honest conviction”’.34 
Canada has followed a similar path. Take the case of Amselem where the Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC) held that Jewish property owners could be exempt from bye-laws which prohibited them from 
building religious huts (succahs) on their property in a condominium.  The condominium managers 
had offered to make available communal succahs as an alternative.  They argued that the insistence 
of the Jewish property owners to build their private succahs on their own property was not a 
requirement of the official teachings of their religion.  The SCC refused to be involved in having to 
assess the orthodoxy of the claimants’ beliefs.  The Court stated that 
the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of religious dogma.  
Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially interpreting and thus determining, either explicitly 
or implicitly, the content of a subjective understanding of religious requirement, “obligation”, 
precept, “commandment”, custom or ritual.  Secular judicial determinations of theological or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
more likely to investigate religious doctrine.  See, in the UK, Shergill & Others v Khaira & Others [2014] UKSC 
33.  In the US, see Jones v Wolf (1979) 443 US 595 (Supreme Court). 
30 Hobby Lobby (n 6). 
31 ibid 35. 
32 ibid 36. 
33 Thomas v Review Bd of Indiana Employment Security Div (1980) 450 US 707 (Supreme Court).  Employment 
Division v Smith 485 US 660 (Supreme Court). 
34 Hobby Lobby (n 6) 37–38. 
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religious disputes, or of contentious matters of religious doctrine, unjustifiably entangle the 
court in the affairs of religion.35 
The SCC then went on to state that, similarly to the USSC, despite refusing to assess the content of 
the belief that gave rise to a conscientious objection, it had the power to assess the sincerity of the 
claimant.  It said that ‘while a court is not qualified to rule on the validity or veracity of any given 
religious practice or belief, or to choose among various interpretations of belief, it is qualified to inquire 
into the sincerity of a claimant’s belief’.36    
Similar reasoning was adopted in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Eweida which has 
been consistently followed by UK courts.37  In that case, two out of the four claimants were subject to 
disciplinary proceedings by their employers for refusing to comply with their employers’ uniform policy 
by visibly wearing a Christian crucifix at work.  They had unsuccessfully sought to be exempt from the 
policy.  The UK government argued that ‘the visible wearing of a cross was [not] a generally 
recognised form of practising the Christian faith, still less one that was regarded as a mandatory 
requirement’.38  Therefore, the UK argued, no protection should be afforded by article 9 of the ECHR 
to the objection to the uniform policy raised by the two claimants.  The ECtHR took the same stance 
taken by the USSC and the SCC.  It said that ‘the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is 
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the 
ways in which those beliefs are expressed’.39  This did not mean that any assertion of religious belief 
would automatically be protected by article 9.  The ECtHR said that ‘The right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion [protected by article 9] denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance’.40  This however is a very light touch enquiry by the courts.  
Guidance provided by the UK House of Lords, which was considered and not rejected by the ECtHR 
in Eweida,41 indicates that a generous approach towards religious beliefs should be taken in 
undertaken this enquiry.  The House of Lords said that 
The belief must relate to matters more than merely trivial. It must possess an adequate 
degree of seriousness and importance. (…) it must be a belief on a fundamental problem. 
With religious belief this requisite is readily satisfied. The belief must also be coherent in the 
sense of being intelligible and capable of being understood. (…) But, again, too much should 
not be demanded in this regard. Typically, religion involves belief in the supernatural. It is not 
always susceptible to lucid exposition or, still less, rational justification (...) Overall, these 
threshold requirements should not be set at a level which would deprive minority beliefs of the 
protection they are intended to have under the Convention.42   
The review above seems to show then that legal doctrines have been adopted in the UK, the ECtHR, 
Canada and US which prohibit judges considering conscientious exemption cases from passing any 
negative moral judgement on the moral permissibility or metaphysical truths of various ethical views 
that have given rise to a claim for conscientious exemption.  This does not mean that these liberal 
democracies allow conscientious exemptions without scrutinising their effects.  There are indeed 
                                                          
35 Amselem v Syndicat Northcrest 2004 SCC 47 [50]. 
36 ibid 51. 
37 Eweida v United Kingdom 2013 IRLR 231.  See Bull v Hall (n 5).  Eweida has also been considered and 
followed in the tax exemption cases referred to above. See Exmoor (n 2). See Blackburn (n 3). 
38 Eweida (n 37) [81]. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid 81. 
41 ibid 45. 
42 R (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 AC 246 [23].  
Under the ECHR non-religious beliefs which relate to matters more than merely trivial also enjoy similar 
protection.  See Bayatna v Armenia (2012) 54 EHRR 15 [110].  See also Exmoor (n 2) [75]. 
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many cases in which a conscientious exemption was not granted because that would result in 
disproportionate harm to the rights of others (e.g. in Bull v Hall43 exempting Christian B&B owners 
from equality duties would result in impermissible harm to same-sex couples) or to the public interest 
(e.g. in Lee44 exempting the Amish from paying social security taxes would undermine an efficient 
national system of taxation).  The standard test is that under Article 18 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which says that 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs [including obtaining a conscientious exemption] 
may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
The existence of these legal doctrines therefore shows that, at least in relation to judicial 
consideration of conscientious exemptions, the practice of granting conscientious exemptions is not 
best described as an act of toleration.  This is because judges do not, and cannot, grant or refuse to 
grant an exemption on the basis of an adverse moral judgement on the religious or non-religious 
beliefs of the claimants.  As it might be apparent from some of the analysis above, judicial 
involvement in the practice of conscientious exemptions is a major part of the general practice of 
conscientious exemptions.  If Nehushtan’s principle of toleration does not hold true for the judicial 
practice of conscientious exemptions then it cannot provide an adequate explanation of the general 
practice of granting conscientious exemptions and the attitude of those who grant exemptions.      
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that even though judges are prohibited by law from 
expressing any negative moral judgement on the beliefs of conscientious objectors and in fact refrain 
from doing so in their judgments, it may still be the case that certain judges in their private capacity 
hold the views of conscientious objectors in contempt but, given their role, refrain from acting on their 
private views and follow the doctrinal injunction.  In this instance Nehushtan may well be right that 
these judges display a measure of toleration.  Nevertheless, just like in the case of the members of 
the legislature, such attitude cannot be attributed to the court or to the judge acting in official capacity.  
Furthermore, the existence of such mental state would be a constant variable of each individual judge 
acting in personal capacity and that cannot help us understand the institutional judicial practice of 
conscientious exemptions.          
C. Conscientious exemptions: From toleration to neutrality 
The previous section explained that judicial doctrines in various liberal states prohibit judges from 
expressing a negative moral judgement about the content of conscientious objectors’ beliefs.  That is 
a doctrinal matter and, if true, should be sufficient to undermine Nehushtan’s thesis that conscientious 
exemptions are a matter of toleration.  However, legal doctrines are not invariable and may develop to 
be the opposite of what they once were.  It is therefore necessary to provide a moral argument in 
favour of the view that, independently of what legal doctrine says and what institutions do, the state 
has no place in expressing negative (or positive) moral judgements about the content of conscientious 
objectors’ beliefs, i.e. it has a duty of neutrality.   
Note that the argument to be provided is one about the content of beliefs (i.e. their truth, 
reasonableness, etc.) and not about acts undertaken by conscientious objectors.  The state regularly 
takes a moral stance about the acts carried out in pursuant to a moral or religious belief.  We have 
seen that, in the US for example, under the RFRA no exemption will be granted if it would interfere 
with a compelling government interest which cannot be protected in a way that is less restrictive on 
the conscientious objector’s religious practices.  Under the Art 18 ICCPR and the ECHR, an 
exemption cannot be granted if that is necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  So the position here defended is that the state ought 
                                                          
43 Bull v Hall (n 5). 
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to be neutral in regards to the content of beliefs but cannot, and should not, be neutral when it comes 
to assessing the impact of the actions of a conscientious objector on vital public interests or on the 
rights of others. 
What then can justify the duty of state neutrality?  There are indeed multiple moral arguments.45  For 
sake of succinctness, only two arguments will be analysed here. These are the arguments from 
pluralism and from futility.  Admittedly, only a shallow analysis of each will be provided here.  Despite 
the shallowness, however, it will be possible to conclude that, as a moral matter, the state should not 
base its decision on whether to grant an exemption by, among other things, judging the content of the 
conscientious objector’s beliefs.  
Pluralism 
The argument from pluralism holds that there are various ways to live a good life and, by implication, 
that there are various legitimate conceptions of what the good life is.  A person may legitimately 
devote his life to religious contemplation or to the study of the intricacies of astrophysics.  He may 
choose a life centred around family values or refuse to commit to a romantic relationship so as to 
focus on his career as an investment banker.  No doubt there will be drawbacks in any of these 
lifestyles.  A life of religious contemplation as a monk, while benefitting from high spirituality, is 
incompatible with the joys of family life.  Studying the intricacies of astrophysics, while contributing to 
knowledge, is unlikely to yield the excitements and pecuniary rewards of the life of an investment 
banker.  However, the point is that various incompatible lifestyles each exhibit something worthwhile, 
even while exhibiting several drawbacks, and it is up to each individual to weight for himself what is 
more worthwhile for him.  Importantly, given that it is the individual that will benefit or suffer the 
consequences of the lifestyle, the choice of which lifestyle to follow is his and not the state’s.   
Note that the argument from pluralism is not an argument about moral relativism or nihilism, 
respectively the view that there is no universal way to establish the moral worth of different lifestyles 
or that different lifestyles cannot be better or worse than each other because morality does not exist. 
Rather the main thrust of the argument is that different lifestyles are objectively valuable in different 
ways and that the individual is the best judge of what is most valuable for him.  The state should stay 
away from dictating what lifestyle is more valuable.  Note also that this argument does not lead to 
undermining the legitimacy of state regulation of the interaction between different lifestyles.  While 
individuals are free to choose what lives to live, they cannot impose their choices on others (they too 
have the right to choose what life to live).  The role of the state then, as guardian of the common 
good, is to ensure that different lifestyles are compatible.  The state can therefore limit acts that would 
undermine the common good and that would infringe others’ right to choose which lifestyle is for 
them. 
The argument from pluralism, if accepted, leads to accepting state neutrality in the context of 
conscientious exemptions in the same way that is reflected in the judicial doctrine analysed.  The 
state has no role in telling Mr Bible Believer or Mr Climate Change not to devote their lives to religious 
beliefs or to deep concern for the environment.  Both lifestyles exhibit something worthwhile despite 
their drawbacks and it is up to the individual to choose what is more worthwhile for him.  However, 
given that both Mr Bible Believer and Mr Climate Change live in a society and are tax payers, the 
state is entitled to ensure that their moral choices do not adversely affect the tax system which is vital 
for the various worthwhile ends to be pursued by the state.  Hence, the state, while not allowed to 
judge their views, is allowed to judge whether their decision not to file their tax returns online is 
compatible with a well-functioning taxation system. 
Futility 
                                                          
45 Koppelman identifies six of them.  Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality (Harvard 
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Let us now consider the argument from futility.  This says that it is futile for the state to express a view 
on the merits of the content of the beliefs of the objector for two reasons.  First, such moral judgement 
is unlikely to lead the objector to change his beliefs.  Second, the moral judgement is totally 
unnecessary for the more important task of safeguarding the public interest or the rights of others 
which the acts of the objector may undermine.   
The first futility argument is really about the difficulty of changing the convictions of objectors, 
especially religious objectors.  Judges and other state officials engaging in criticism of religious beliefs 
in a rational fashion are unlikely to affect any meaningful change in the belief systems of the objector.  
This is because religious beliefs are often held as a matter of faith.  As Macklem argues  
[F]aith exists as a form of rival to reason. When we say that we believe in something as a 
matter of faith, or to put it the other way round, when we say that we have faith in certain 
beliefs, we express a commitment to that which cannot be established by reason, or to that 
which can be established by reason, but not for that reason (…) faith treats itself as a reason 
to believe, and to act in accordance with belief, without submitting to the conditions of 
reason.46           
When it comes to religious beliefs which state officials think are wrong, it is futile to engage the 
objector in conversations about how his beliefs are misguided unless the state official is able to speak 
the same faith-based language of the objector.   
Even if the belief is non-faith based and is instead reason-based, such as that of Mr Climate Change, 
it might be equally futile to engage the objector in conversations about the merits of his beliefs.  This 
is mainly because, in the context of a liberal democracy with free speech, the objector is likely to have 
already been exposed to all sorts of arguments that contradict his beliefs (e.g. that factory farming of 
animals is a more serious concern for climate change).  Why would a state official expressing a 
contrary view to his make any difference?  If the objector has gone through the trouble of litigation to 
secure an exemption in order to accommodate his beliefs that alone should give an indication of how 
deeply held and immoveable those beliefs are.  This is not to say that deeply held beliefs are not 
changeable.  However, we may be sceptical that the lengthy process that is necessary to revise one’s 
deeply held beliefs can be successfully affected by state disapproval. 
Even if the above were wrong, the second limb of the futility argument might still be convincing.  It 
says that the more urgent task for state officials is to determine whether granting an exemption will 
undermine vital public interests or the rights of others.  The task of expressing negative moral 
judgements about the content of the objector’s beliefs does not contribute to that urgent task and is 
therefore futile for the real task at hand.  We only need to look at the consequences of the purported 
acts of the objector and not to the quality of his beliefs.  
One may object, as Nehushtan does, to this second argument.  He says that expressing a view about 
the content of the objector’s belief may make a practical difference to the outcome.  He gives the 
example of a prospective non-white employee who seeks employment from an employer who, for 
religious reasons, holds that white people should not mix with non-whites and therefore refuses to 
employ the prospective non-white employee.  Nehushtan assumes in this scenario that there is no 
serious problem of racism in the employment market and that the prospective employee immediately 
finds employment with another employer.  Nehushtan argues that given that the employee will not 
have suffered any meaningful harm, except perhaps a slight offence having found alternative 
employment, it would not be possible to condemn the employer’s behaviour unless the state takes 
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into account the religiously motivated racist quality of his beliefs and denies the exemption on that 
basis.47   
Nehushtan’s example is not a good one against state neutrality for two reasons.  First, if there are no 
good reasons to prohibit a religiously motivated act then that act should not be prohibited.  It is not, as 
Nehushtan argues, that we decide that certain acts are not acceptable and then seek reasons to 
prohibit them (in this case judging the quality of the conviction that gave rise to the non-employment).  
Nehushtan’s argument is essentially one which allows prejudice against religion and then looks for 
post-facto justifications for that prejudice.  Secondly, there is in fact a strong reason for prohibiting the 
act of the employer without having to judge the quality of his beliefs: his refusal to employ the non-
white prospective employee for the reason of his race is seriously humiliating and hence harmful.  Not 
only does the humiliation provide reasons for offence and may occasion psychological harm, it also 
sends the signal that the non-white employee is a lesser member of society because a lesser human 
being.  In a society where such acts are allowed, victims of such humiliation are likely to suffer loss of 
self-respect and self-worth, in short their wellbeing is seriously harmed.48  This alone is a sufficient 
reason for not allowing such acts; it is unnecessary to have to judge the content of the employer’s 
beliefs. 
D. Does claiming a legal right to exemption deserve a negative moral 
judgement? 
The previous section explained that sound moral analysis seems to lead to the conclusion that the 
state should be neutral about conscientious objectors’ beliefs.  However, before affirming that 
conclusion a strong counter-argument needs to be addressed.  This counter-argument says that it 
may well be that morally sound legal doctrines prohibit judges from expressing a negative moral 
judgement about the content of objectors’ beliefs.  However, that does not preclude another kind of 
negative judgement about the objectors.  In particular, conscientious objectors may be viewed as 
undermining the authority of the law by objecting to complying with their legal obligations and as 
obstructing whatever public good the law they object to can be interpreted to be pursuing.  For 
example, on the assumption that the obligation to file tax returns online serves the purpose of an 
efficient tax system, Mr Bible Believer and Mr Climate Change should be viewed negatively for trying 
to obstruct the pursuit of this purpose and generally for trying to escape the obligations the law has 
imposed on them.  While a judge may nevertheless grant an exemption (for whatever principled or 
prudential reason), the judge should necessarily be viewed as condemning the law-undermining 
attitude of the objectors.  After all, one of the essential roles of judges is to enforce the law so they 
necessarily ought to condemn those who seek to escape their legal obligations (whether or not for 
reasons of conscience). 
This counter-argument, while very intuitive, is misplaced primarily because it is addressed to the 
wrong target.  Conscientious objectors, by contrast to non-conscientious law breakers and some 
instances of civil disobedience, do not seek to escape their legal obligations; they claim instead that 
they have a legal right not to comply with particular legal obligations.49  Mr Bible Believer and Mr 
Climate Change, for example, claim exemption from the online tax filing requirement on the basis of a 
particular exemption provided in a particular piece of legislation or regulation.50  They are asserting 
that the law has provided that they be exempt and are simply asserting their legal right.  This is the 
                                                          
47 Nehushtan, Intolerant Religion (n 9) 146–147. 
48 This is an argument borrowed from Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University Press 
2014) ch 5.  Waldron refers to dignitary harm while the present argument refers to humiliation, mainly 
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same type of claim asserted by other conscientious objectors considered above.  In Hobby Lobby, the 
company claimed a legal right under RFRA not to be coerced to provide mandatory contraceptive 
cover.  In Amselem, the property owners were claiming a right under the provisions of freedom of 
religion under the Quebec and the Canadian Charters not to be compelled to comply with bye-laws 
that would prevent them from building their own succahs.  In Eweida, the applicants invoked article 9 
ECHR protecting religious freedom not to be compelled to comply with their employers’ ban of their 
necklaces with crucifixes.  Rather than escaping their legal obligations, these objectors were merely 
claiming that the law, properly construed, did not impose on them the obligations they objected to.  In 
these cases the courts accepted the objectors’ assertion of the existence of a legal right to exemption.  
Objectors deserve no moral condemnation for asserting their legal rights. 
Of course, asserting the existence of a particular legal right is entirely different from having one.  No 
doubts certain individuals will unscrupulously conjure creative legal claims to mask their law-breaking 
efforts.  Take the US case of Quaintance to see that this is a serious issue.51  In that case, a group of 
related individuals who were the founding members of the Church of Cognizance were charged with 
being in possession of 50kg of marijuana.  The alleged core belief of the members of this church is 
that ‘marijuana is a sacrament and deity and that the consumption of marijuana is a means of 
worship’.52  They maintained that the criminal prohibition of narcotics substantially burdened their 
religious beliefs and was in violation of the RFRA.  The trial judge was faced with the challenge to 
determine whether their claim was sincere or whether ‘the Quaintances were acting for the sake of 
convenience, i.e. because they believed the church would cloak [them] with the protection of the 
law’.53  Having determined that they were drug traffickers who made use of and sold other drugs, 
including cocaine, the judge found for the latter option.  But note that the issue in this case was not 
that a legal right to be exempt from the prohibition of narcotics does not exist.  Other US cases, in 
relation to Rastafarians for example, have held that it does exist.54  The issue was whether the 
claimants qualified for that right; because the enjoyment of the right depended on a sincere 
conscientious objection the insincere claimants were held not to qualify.           
Conscientious objectors ought not to be judged negatively for claiming the existence of a legal right to 
exemption from particular legal obligations.  No doubt individuals who insincerely pretend to hold a 
conscientious objection should be judged negatively for their insincerity.  But, by definition, these 
insincere claimants are not actually conscientious objectors.  Also, it is not disputed that conscientious 
objectors are seeking to escape particular legal obligations, e.g. filing tax returns online.  However, 
that does not mean that they are undermining the authority of law.  As long as they make a genuine 
legal claim that another law exempts them from complying with a particular legal obligation they are 
respecting legal authority because they are employing legal means.   
Note that conscientious objectors do not argue that it is their conscience that relieves them from a 
particular legal duty.  While it is their conscience that leads them to object to a particular legal duty, 
they claim that it is the law that should relieve them from that legal duty.  In sum, they ask courts to 
resolve a conflict between two legal norms, one imposing a particular legal obligation they object to, 
and the other granting them a legal right to exemption.  Conscientious objectors deserve no moral 
condemnation for that request because that is a routine affair of the law.  Journalists, for example, will 
claim that particular laws protecting private life conflict with their legal right to publish information 
which is in the public interest (e.g. regarding extra-marital affairs of a politician).  No one should 
suggest that such claimants, if they make their case in good faith and conscientiously, deserve 
condemnation for seeking to escape the laws protecting private life.   
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In sum, the principle of toleration cannot bite simply based on the fact that conscientious objectors 
assert their legal rights because such an assertion should not invite negative moral judgement.  We 
may of course wonder why the law should grant them such a right to exemption in the first place.  For 
the reasons illustrated in this part, we ought not to look at the principle of toleration.  We will do better 
to look elsewhere.  The next part tentatively sets out the moral basis of such a legal right to 
exemption. 
4. Conscientious Exemptions: From Neutrality to Respect  
 
The conclusion reached in the last part that the principle of toleration cannot describe or guide the 
practice of conscientious exemptions might lead to a serious worry.  The worry is that there is no 
principled reason for granting conscientious exemptions.  In fact, if Nehushtan had been right then we 
would have had a prima facie reason to entertain the claims of Mr Bible Believer and Mr Climate 
Change: they have a right to be tolerated.  In fact, on the (contested) assumption that toleration is a 
political virtue,55 we may have had a normative reason to exempt the objectors: we want the state to 
act virtuously and we thereby grant a right to exemption.  However, if exempting objectors is not 
linked to the virtue of toleration, we no longer have a principled reason to grant exemptions to the two 
claimants.  Sure, there might be pragmatic or supererogatory reasons.  We might, for example, think 
that it makes no difference to an efficient tax system whether businesses submit their tax returns 
online or on paper so exemptions may be granted from what appears to be a very ad hoc rule of 
requiring online tax returns.  Alternatively, we might think that while the general rule has serious 
merits (e.g. the online system can help HMRC spend fewer resources when collecting taxes or help it 
combat tax evasion), the state ought not to be too harsh on those few who object to the rule.  An 
exemption may thereby be granted as an act of kindness. 
The pragmatic and supererogatory responses do not however make sense of the right-based 
language of the practice of conscientious exemptions.  As articulated above, under RFRA, the 
ICCPR, the ECHR and other legal instruments, individuals claim a non-absolute right to conscientious 
exemption and the state is under an obligation to comply with such a claim unless doing so would 
undermine a compelling government interest (in the case of RFRA) or important public interests or the 
right of others (in the case of the ICCPR or the ECHR).  It may well be that these documents are 
misguided and do not reflect any underlying moral right to exemption.  There is high judicial precedent 
for this view.  The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the US Constitution (‘Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’) 
used to be interpreted as granting a general non-absolute right to conscientious exemption for 
religious objectors.56  However, in Smith, the USSC decided that this approach was not principled.  
Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority said 
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful 
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on 
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual 
development." (…) To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the 
law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compelling" -- 
permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself," (…) contradicts both 
constitutional tradition and common sense.57 
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Others have joined in to criticise the existence of a right to conscientious exemption.  Some argue that 
exemptions should not be granted as they involve subsidising what are essentially expensive tastes: 
individuals should bear the responsibility for the consequences of the beliefs they endorse even 
though those consequences may be very costly.58   Others say that if there is a sufficiently strong 
reason to grant an exemption that reason should ordinarily be strong enough to motivate changing the 
rule so that it no longer encroaches on the objectors.  A ‘rule and exemption’ approach betrays the 
egalitarian commitment that members of a political society should all be ruled by the same 
standards.59  A more recent argument says that conscientious exemptions undermine the sovereignty 
of the liberal democratic state by requiring it to bow down to the assertion of a citizen’s commitment to 
other sources of moral sovereignty, including religious sovereignty.60 
All of these arguments give serious reasons to believe that the rights-based language of the practice 
of conscientious exemptions is not only unprincipled, but it is also misguided.  A way to investigate 
whether that conclusion is warranted is either to face head-on these counter-arguments to the rights-
based language and see whether they withstand scrutiny or, alternatively, to point to another 
principle, other than toleration, which may justify the use of a right-based language for that practice.  
For reasons of succinctness, this paper takes the latter approach.  This means that those counter-
arguments, together with the doubts they give rise to, may still survive.  However, if the practice is 
based on an attractive principle, that principle may partially override the worries created by the 
identified counter-arguments.  The argument to be advanced is that there is not only one principle 
grounding the rights-based practice of conscientious exemptions.  There is a cluster of mutually 
reinforcing moral principles which justify that practice.   
A. Respecting values 
To see that the practice of conscientious exemptions is not without moral foundation we need to start 
by borrowing from the argument from pluralism made above.  It was argued that the state should not 
judge the content of the beliefs of conscientious objectors because, among other things, that would 
run counter to the individual responsibility to determine what lifestyle is worthwhile.  It was said that 
various incompatible lifestyles each exhibit something worthwhile, even while exhibiting several 
drawbacks, and it is up to each individual to weight for himself what is more worthwhile for him.  
Importantly, given that it is the individual that will benefit or suffer the consequences of the lifestyle, 
the choice of which lifestyle to follow is his and not the state’s.   
If this is accepted it may partially ground a claimed right to conscientious exemption.  In fact when the 
state imposes a general rule, that rule may create a barrier to an individual’s chosen lifestyle (e.g. the 
prohibition of drug possession may create a barrier to living according to the Rastafarian ceremonial 
use of cannabis).  That may of course be another of the drawbacks of being committed to that lifestyle 
and the individual may need to reconsider whether that lifestyle is really worth it with the burden which 
the state has imposed.  However, remember that the argument from pluralism is essentially an 
argument for state neutrality.  In imposing a particular rule which creates a barrier to the pursuit of a 
particular lifestyle, the state may be portrayed as violating its duty of neutrality: the state makes 
certain lifestyles less accessible and thereby incentivises individuals to choose other lifestyles (i.e. the 
more accessible ones).  If the state is to remain neutral among competing lifestyles it should therefore 
grant an exemption to alleviate the barrier it has created.  Of course, the imposition of the particular 
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rule may be justified by reference to vital public interests or to the rights of others (e.g. combating 
drug-related criminality).  So the granting of the exemption will depend on whether it would seriously 
undermine those interests and rights.  This is however a reason to make the right to exemption non-
absolute rather than rejecting the right altogether. 
The argument above is essentially one that derives a non-absolute right to exemption from the state’s 
duty of neutrality.  It is an argument calling for the state to respect and promote pluralism.  But notice 
that there are other values at play here that reinforce this argument.  The most obvious is perhaps the 
insistence that personal autonomy should be respected by the state.  The idea of personal autonomy 
‘is that people should make their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life. 
The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, 
fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives’.61  It is possible to argue that 
committing oneself to a particular lifestyle (e.g. one committed to a particular religion) is an expression 
of personal autonomy.  The person that is committed to a particular religion will make a variety of 
choices which will have a myriad of implications for his life.  A portion of those implications would 
have been different had he committed himself to another religion or to non-religion.  By being allowed 
to be committed to any religion or non-religion the individual is thereby being allowed to lead a more 
autonomous life and to shape the course of his life.  The state that values and respects personal 
autonomy will thereby allow the freedom for individuals to pursue whichever lifestyle they identify with.  
Of course, as discussed multiple times, the state cannot permit all expressions of every lifestyle.  
Some will collude with fundamental public interests and/or the rights of others.  However, the state’s 
respect for personal autonomy leads to respecting various manifestations of different lifestyles, 
although not of all. 
Respect for personal autonomy does not directly lead to justifying the assertion of a right to be 
exempt from various legal duties.  However, respect for autonomy leads to reinforcing the case for 
that right:  if the state grants exemptions (perhaps on the basis of state neutrality sketched above) 
that promotes personal autonomy and that is virtuous.  In fact, as stated, an exemption from a legal 
duty incompatible with a lifestyle diminishes the costs of accessing or continuing to identify with a 
particular lifestyle; it increases options for individuals.  Personal autonomy is about, among other 
things, access to an adequate range of options.62  By granting an exemption the state increases the 
range of lifestyles which an individual may identify with and live according to.  It thereby promotes 
personal autonomy. 
Respect for personal autonomy reinforces the case for granting conscientious exemptions.  However, 
respecting autonomy also usually involves, at least in the context of conscientious objection, respect 
for liberty of conscience.  We may understand conscience as a person’s faculty ‘for searching for life's 
ethical basis and its ultimate meaning’. 63  Consequently, we may understand liberty of conscience as 
the liberty to live one’s life according to the normative imperatives imposed by conscience.  These 
normative imperatives may originate from religious directives or from non-religious ones.  
Commitment to a particular lifestyle, whether religious or not, will normally include a judgement that 
the lifestyle is compatible and/or required by one’s conscientious convictions. Otherwise the individual 
would find himself living in a pathological bipolar situation whereby he considers a lifestyle valuable 
but completely at odds with his convictions about what is right or wrong.  No doubt such pathological 
cases exist.  A professional killer may be committed to his lifestyle because of its luxurious rewards 
while fully appreciating its moral wrongness.  However, in non-pathological cases, individuals 
subscribe to a particular lifestyle, among other things, because they believe it to be right or morally 
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required.  This is usually the case for religious lifestyles.  Individuals commit to living according to the 
edicts of a particular religion because they believe that living that way is required by God, the main 
source of their moral imperatives.  It is their belief in a deity that leads them to commit to a particular 
lifestyle.  In order words, it is liberty of conscience which influences the way they exercise their right to 
personal autonomy.  It follows that when the state respects personal autonomy by granting an 
exemption it normally also respects freedom of conscience. 
When the state refuses to grant an exemption this may not only encroach on personal autonomy or 
freedom of conscience; it may occasion harm to the objector, i.e. undermine her wellbeing.  
Remember that when an exemption is denied the objector may be coerced to perform an act which 
she believes to be wrong.  Using the usual example, if Mr Bible Believer’s and Mr Climate Change’s 
claims for exemptions are denied they will be coerced to file their tax return online.  But doing such 
act goes against their conscience and that might undermine their well-being. In fact when an 
individual makes a claim of conscience she is normally so committed to her beliefs that acting against 
them ‘would result in a loss of personal and moral integrity with consequences, such as profound guilt 
and remorse, which would have an adverse effect on the person’s self-conception and self-respect’.  
This, in turn, would affect the person’s well-being.64  Of course the individual may refuse to yield to 
legal coercion and pay the consequences, e.g. close down their business because they cannot file 
their tax returns on non-electronic means.  However, succumbing to legal punishment rather than 
acting against one’s conscience also undermines one’s well-being.  It follows that when the state 
grants a conscientious exemption it is usually also paying respect to an aspect of the objector’s well-
being. 
5. Conclusion: Treating Religious and Non-Religious 
Conscientious Objectors Alike 
 
If the arguments of the preceding part are correct, they entail that a non-absolute right to 
conscientious exemption is justified by reference to a cluster of values, including respect for state 
neutrality, personal autonomy, freedom of conscience and concern for well-being. No doubt other 
arguments could be made to show that other values are involved.65  However, these suffice to 
temporarily ground the practice of granting conscientious exemptions in recognisable moral values.  
Remember, however, that the practice cannot be fully morally justified until the objections to it which 
were illustrated above66 are overcome.  That task is left for another day.  The discussion until now 
should bring some confidence that the rights-based discourse of conscientious exemptions is not 
senseless.  Furthermore, it also provides another reason not to heed to Nehushtan’s insistence that 
the principle of toleration grounds the practice of conscientious exemptions.  If, as argued, we can 
make reference to an alternative cluster of principles we need not make reference to the principle of 
toleration. 
What can the cluster of moral principles identified tell us about how to adjudicate conscientious 
exemption claims?  Apart from telling us that there are good reasons to think that the claims are 
correctly framed as a matter of right, the cluster also militates against various theorists’ insistence that 
religious claimants should be, all things being equal, more or less likely to lose their claims that non-
religious claimants depending on whether religion is judged to be inherently worthy or blameworthy.  
In fact the cluster of principles seems to be insensitive to the religious or non-religious nature of the 
beliefs of the conscientious objectors.  The state’s duty of neutrality is specifically against unequal 
treatment depending on the nature of the beliefs.  Also, respect for autonomy, conscience and well-
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being are insensitive to the particular content of the beliefs of the objectors.  The only criterion 
considered is that exemptions should not be granted if that would result in undermining fundamental 
public interests or the rights of others. That criterion is neutral to the religious or non-religious nature 
of the belief involved. 
So what is the implication of the discussion for Mr Bible Believer and Mr Climate Change?  The 
legislative right to be exempt from the duty to file their tax returns online reflects an underlying and 
more general moral right to conscientious exemption.  It is a right that both should equally have the 
ability to claim and to enjoy.  Furthermore, we should view the grant of the legislative right as a 
determination by the legislature that the exemption will not undermine fundamental public interests or 
the rights of others.  That determination is of course open to challenge but that would necessitate an 
in depth analysis of the purposes of the requirement of online tax filing and how that requirement 
serves the public interest.  That analysis is left for another day.  
 
